

Machine Learning in Cyber Security Response and Automation

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- Highlight Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure and Governmental Organisations
- Identify and Demonstrate Cyber Threat Detection in Complex Environments
- Establish why AI and ML is apprpriate for autonomous vulnerable host detection
- Present a Cyber Framework for Autonomous Cyber Response

Cyber Threat Landscape



- Targeted Attacks
 > 0-Days
- Increased Disruption
 - Internet outage
- Distortion
 - Mis-information
 - Falsified Information
- Deterioration
 - Legacy Systems



Home Owner Threat Landscape

- Sensitive IoT information
- Listening Home Assistants
- Vulnerable Connected Devices
 - ➢ Routers
 - Cameras
 - Babyphones
 - > Dolls





Critical Infrastructure Threat Landscape

- Targeted Attacks
- Supply Chain Infiltration
- Legacy Systems
- SCADA Systems
- Crypto-mining Malwares (2018 – Water Infrastructures)





Governmental Threat Landscape


- Cyber Espionage
- Public Misinformation
- Foreign Governments
 Interference
- Cyber Physical Attacks¹
 - > Energy
 - Transport
 - Banking
 - Financial Markets
 - > Health
 - Water Supply
 - Digital Infrastructure











Actors/Targets

Creates

Vulnerabilities

Discovers Unknown Vulnerabilities

Expolits

Known Vulnerabilities

Nuisance

Attacks/Defenses

https://www.recordedfuture.com/prioritizing-cyber-threats/

Complex Networks



- Heterogeneous Networks
- Distributed Networks
- Internet of Things (IoT)
 - Physical Implications



Machine Learning



- Blue Team (Reactive)
 - Network Anomaly Detection
 - Intrusion Detection Systems
 - User Behaviour
 - Identify misinformation
 Government
 interference and Fake
 News
- Red Team (Proactive)
 - Vulnerable Host Identification
 - Automated Cyber Response



Data Challenge




- Clarify Objectives
- Collect Appropriate
 Data
- All data is manipulated data¹
- Create Synthetic & Real Representative Datasets
- Datasets must be flexible



Current Intrusion Detection Datasets






Intrusion Detection Systems (Blue Team)



- Detect Attacks against SCADA Networks
- Improve Security information and event management (SIEM)
- Detect 0-Day attacks




Water Supply Intrusion Detection Systems

- Accurately detect Attacks against
 - The SCADA Network
 - The Sensors
- Provide Key Information to the Operator on the type attacks
 - Cyber Attack
 - Breakdown (Predictive Modeling)
 - Sabotage



Potential Hits to the Tank






Vulnerable Hosts Identification (Red Team)




- Penetration testing of large corporate network
 - Expensive
 - Time consuming
 - Analysing results
 - Vulnerable hosts identification
- Automated exploitation (e.g. Metasploit)
 - Time consuming
- Automated Vulnerability Scanner
 - Inconvenient Output (With Large Network)

686513 4746C65 16E6420746 BreachE204 6520 1A07 6573204C697474CC 5205 ck696EA1 86FAF64206 206E61 F766 6C792 652A 261736B60142E204 808B4FA017745C7A6 108 00F2A5697D011A56AFE64 20736852756B013 0AA2 719System Safety Com 028BE5BF7D011A0010A3B






Vulnerable Hosts Identification (Nmap)





Vulnerable Hosts Identification (Nessus)




Vulnerable Hosts Identification (Combined)



Recommendations provided

10.0.0.5 : Windows 7 SP0 10.0.0.7 HP iLO 2 10.0.0.185. Linux 3.11 Kernel

All these hosts contain a vulnerability and are exploitable



Recommended attack vectors:

10.0.0.5 : "Microsoft Windows 7 SP0 - SP1, Windows Server 2008 SP1, or Windows 8. Prediction accuracy: 100"

10.0.0.7 : "HP iLO 2 remote management interface. Prediction accuracy: 100"

10.0.0.185 : "Linux 3.11 - 3.14. Prediction accuracy: 100"

10.0.0.1 : "Linux 2.6.18 - 2.6.22. Prediction accuracy: 86"

10.0.0.3 : "Linux 3.11 - 3.14. Prediction accuracy: 100"

Vulnerable Hosts Identification

University



- Vulnerable hosts (Same Vulnerability)
- Non-Vulnerable Hosts
- Outliers

Targeted Attacks

- Identify outliers (printers, servers, etc)
- Accurately identify infected hosts
 - > Malware
 - Crypto-miners
 - ≻ Etc..

Autonomous Cyber Response



- Offensive Cyber Security
 - Deterrent: Integral part of the military power




Autonomous Cyber Response (Blue Team)



- Anticipate Threats
- Autonomously Detect Incidents (Internal and Externals)
- Reduced Escalation & Automated Recovery (Moving Target Defense)
- Automated Incident Investigation and Triage (Digital Forensics)

Autonomous Cyber Response (Red Team)





Human in the Loop: Critical Thinking Factors



 NATO Article 5 is the backbone of our collective defence
 Sufficiently vague for the selection of the level of deterrent (avoiding cyber attacks under a threshold)



1 Caton, Jeffrey L. "Exploring the prudent limits of automated cyber attack." 2013 5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CYCON 2013). IEEE, 2013.

Kinetic Response



May 12, 2019 | Topic: Security | Blog Brand: The Buzz | Tags: Israel, Cyber Warfare, War, Gaza, Hamas

Israel Bombed Cyber Hackers (That Is Historic, For Many Reasons)

Should nation-states start kinetic conflicts over cyber battles?







Israel Defense Forces 🤗

CLEARED FOR RELEASE: We thwarted an attempted Hamas cyber offensive against Israeli targets. Following our successful cyber defensive operation, we targeted a building where the Hamas cyber operatives work.

HamasCyberHQ.exe has been removed. 🗇 5,402 4:55 PM - May 5, 2019

Autonomous Cyber Response (Red Team)



- Training is central (Cyber Range H2020 FORESIGHT Project Starting in September 2019 – 22 Partners)
 - Advanced Threat Detection
 - Data Analytics Capabilities
 - Attack Attribution
 - Passive and Active Information Gathering
 - Algorithmic Capabilities
 - Consequence Evaluation and Monitoring





- Challenges of ML in Cyber Security
 - Heterogeneous Networks
 - Representative Training Data
 - Complex Threat Landscape
 - Ethical Concerns



Questions